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Abstract
This paper shows that a simple scheme of non-linear taxes coupled
with tradable pollution permits can secure the rst best outcome even
in absence of information about abatement costs. Evidence of the
existence of a Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium is given. Di¤erential
system theory and stochastic approximation are used to prove that
the outcome is globally and locally stable. Equilibrium is reached
after repeated play. At each round agents make myopic steps and
form local approximations, restricting their attention to one variable
at any stage. The same procedure also applies also when stochastic
elements are involved.
1 Introduction
To mitigate pollution, the scheme proposed in this paper implements a sce-
nario advocated by Weitzman (1978). In this scenario, each rm pays a
non-linear tax that depends solely on its own emission. The advantage of
such a tax is that companies avoid problems with information and strategic
choice. Moreover, if the planner has the necessary information on each rms
abatement costs, he can equate individual tax rates with marginal damage.
Firms will then choose their level of emissions such that the realized outcome
becomes Pareto optimal.
For simplicity Weitzman assumed a rather heavy informational burden
on the planner. The format proposed here, in contrast, only requires that
the planner knows marginal damage. He uses that information to levy a non-
linear tax on the industrys emission which coincides with total damage. The
tax is distributed among rms such that each rm pays a fee that depends
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solely on its own emission. The individual tax function contains then a
parameter construed as share permit. The role of this parameter is to give
the holder of a specic amount of permits a tax advantage compared to those
rms bestowed with lower share holdings. Consequently, shares are wanted
and they are marketable. In this way the promoted concept of tradable
non-linear fees is justied.
Firms in this scheme are relieved from strategic considerations. Then,
when I assume optimally behaving rms and a competitive market, the Nash
equilibrium, which usually is not Pareto optimal, becomes indeed so. In this
equilibrium, the sum that each rm is willing to pay for permits and the tax
that each rm pays for emissions total what the companies would pay facing
a full information Pigouvian unit tax.
The tradable fee scheme has been suggested in Berglann (2012). However,
as is often the case in economic literature, that paper focuses solely on the
state of equilibrium. It does not address how the socially desirable equilib-
rium is reached, and whether it is locally or globally stable. My motivation
for this paper is to compensate for that shortcoming (or neglect) by showing
that the equilibrium can indeed be reached, and that it is stable. In doing so
I will consider a repeated game where every rm and the regulator are the
players. Each player has limited capabilities to optimize and predict. I will
also assume that rms are able to pay attention to only one variable at any
time, and that they may be plagued with stochastic disturbances.
Section 2 reintroduces the model of Berglann (2012) in an intertemporal
setting, and Section 3 reviews the mode of regulation. Section 4 analyzes
the repeated play towards equilibrium. The game is graphically illustrated
in Section 5. Section 6 contains concluding remarks.
2 The Model
Consider a multi-period model with a nite set I of rms ( jIj  1). In
periods absent regulation, every company i 2 I has an activity that in each
year creates emission e0i of a homogeneous e­ uent. In periods when rms
are subject to control, each rm i is encouraged to reduce emission to ei  e0i
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at a private cost per period given by the function
Ci (ei)
where Ci (e0i ) = 0, @Ci=@ei < 0 and @
2Ci= (@ei)
2 > 0.
Let e :=
P
ei denote total emission of the industry in a year under
regulation. This emission, measured in monetary terms, causes social damage
in that period described by the function
D (e)
where D (0) = 0, D0 > 0, and D00 > 0. The damage function D () is similar
for all periods, but the current years damage depends on only that years
emission.
The full-information welfare optimum for the period is identied by the
problem
min
ei0;8i
(X
i
Ci (ei) +D (e)
)
. (1)
Assuming interior solutions, the necessary optimality condition is
 @Ci
@ei
= D0 (e) (2)
for all i. Strict convexity of the objective in (1) ensures that (2) also is a
su¢ cient condition and that the solution is unique.
Environmental regulation is performed by a central agent who knows
nothing about the rms abatement cost function Ci (). This agent does
know, however, the damage function D () and he can observe every rm is
emission ei for that year. I assume that each company i is a prot-maximizing
body well informed about the data pertaining directly to itself.
In the next section, I review the scheme advocated in Berglann (2012),
which utilizes the fact that non-linear taxes levied on rms each year can be
made tradable.
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3 Tradable Fees: Equilibrium Analysis
Assume that in the beginning of a period every rm i subject to regulation
is informed that at the end of the year it will be charged an individual tax
ti = T (ei; si) := siD

ei
si

(3)
Here, as previously stated, ei is the (perfectly) observed amount of pollutant
emitted by rm i during the period. The entity si should be construed as rm
is holding of share permits at the end of the period. This license authorizes
the rm to refuse any tax claim above the one determined by the schedule (3).
Such share certicates are valid only during the considered period, and rms
buy them in a permit market that has a total supply
P
si := 1. Note that
a rms holdings of sharepermits need not equal its actual share of total
emission or total tax payments, although it may in equilibrium. Note also
that @ti=@ei = D0 (ei=si). Since the marginal damage D0() increases with its
argument ei=si, a higher si value for constant ei means a lower marginal tax.
Thus, a high si holding at the end of the year appears worthwhile to rm i.
As mentioned, rms acquire share certicates in a permit market that is
open during the period. Assuming fully competitive exchanges, there should
be a market-clearing price  per unit of si, satisfying the complementarity
condition X
si   1  0,   0, 
X
si   1

= 0. (4)
Firm i, seeking to minimize its total expenses, faces the decision problem
min
ei0;si0

Ci (ei) + siD

ei
si

+ si

. (5)
Assuming interior solutions to (5) the two necessary optimality conditions
are
 C 0i (ei) = D0

ei
si

(6)
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 =
ei
si
D0

ei
si

 D

ei
si

: (7)
Proposition 1. Conditions (6) and (7) are su¢ cient for an interior so-
lution of problem (5). 
Proposition 2. Suppose the constraint
P
si = 1 is enforced. Then si,
i 2 I, will be distributed among rms such that consistency is obtained. That
is,
e =
ei
si
for all i.  (8)
The proof of Proposition 1 involves showing that siD (ei=si) is convex (see
Berglann, 2012). The intuition behind the proof of Proposition 2 is as fol-
lows. Derivation of the right-hand side of expression (7) with respect to the
argument ei=si yields
ei
si
D00

ei
si

.
From D00 > 0 it follows that the expression is monotonically increasing in
the ratio ei=si. This ratio must therefore be equal for all rms because they
are all facing the same share permit price . The common ratio must also
be equal to the ratio between the sums
P
ei and
P
si. Since
P
si = 1 and
e =
P
ei the result is
ei
si
=
P
eiP
si
= e
which equals Proposition 2. It follows then from (6)
 C 0i (ei) = D0
P
eiP
si

= D0 (e)
for all i which is equivalent to (2). This entails
Proposition 3. The tax rule (3) and the enforcement of
P
si = 1 yield
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a socially optimal level of pollution for all i. That is, the Nash solution is
Pareto e¢ cient. 
Note that equation (7) is rm is inverse demand function for share per-
mits. (8) implies that in equilibrium no rm buys more share permits than
it needs, and that
 = eD0 (e) D (e) ; (9)
wherefrom follows
Proposition 4. For each rm, the fee (3) plus expenses for si equals the tax
the rm would face under the full-information Pigouvian unit tax  := D0(e)
determined by
T (ei; si) + si = D
0 (e) ei = ei:  (10)
The next section is the main body of this paper. It develops a perspec-
tive on how a centralized planner using non-linear taxation of decentralized
emissions may lead rms to reach a Pareto optimal level of emissions. Dif-
ferential system theory, and stochastic approximation are the vehicles used.
4 Stepwise Evolution of Emission Control
Thus far, I have assumed that the market for tax liabilities (recorded as share
permits) is fully competitive. I have also implicitly assumed that each agent
acts rationally based on correct expectations of the other playersbehavior.
The Pareto e¢ cient Nash solution is supposed to be achieved in one single
shot by letting the price  be determined in the market by the course of
action that makes each rm i choose the appropriate ei and si equilibrium
values.
Noncooperative Game theory, quite reasonably, cannot - and does not -
claim that real, human-like players, when facing complex situations, will set-
tle in Nash equilibrium right away. So the question related to the non-linear
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tax scheme is how eventually the Nash solution can come about. Moreover,
what is the role of the regulator in such a situation?
I assume the following. The regulator has perfect knowledge of the dam-
age function D (). Being the sole supplier of share permits, he can freely
set permit prices. Thus, he may be construed as a Stackelberg leader who
rst sets the price  in the non-cooperative game where the rms are the
competitive followers.
Once the regulator has determined a price, he must supply rms with
the permit quantity that is demanded at that price. Because the planner
does not have full information about the rmsabatement costs and their
behavior, he is presumably unable to attain the wanted goal
P
si = 1 in
the rst trial. However, he might at least approximate that goal in due time
by learning from previous periods. He then modies total permit purchases
by adjusting the price . A simple model for such price adjustments is a
(one-dimensional) Walrasian tâtonnement process (e.g., Varian, 1992). In
continuous-time format, its simplest form is
@
@t
= z () (11)
where z () :=
P
si () 1 is a continuous function interpreted as the excess
demand of permits.
Concerning rms, I realistically assume that they are plagued by uncer-
tainty in abatement costs. Firm is expenses caused by the regulatory regime
is then
i =  (ei; si; !) := Ci (ei; !) + siD

ei
si

+ si (12)
where the elementary event ! (common for all rms; e.g. changes in weather
conditions) belongs to a complete probability space (
;F ; F ). With respect
to this probability space one can take the mathematical expectation E () :=R


F (d!). Each function (ei; si; !) 7 !  (ei; si; !) 2 R+ is convex and
continuously di¤erentiable in (ei; si) 2 R2+, and integrable in ! 2 
.
Each rm has limited cognitive capabilities to predict how other players
strategies will unfold. It will, however, persistently keep an eye on its mar-
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ginal expenses because that entity, a so-called gradient, indicates a promising
direction in which the current strategy should be changed (e.g., Corchon and
Mas-Coell, 1996; Flåm, 2002). The adjustments made by rm i of si and ei
can therefore be described by the equations
@si
@t
=  @i
@si
=
ei
si
D0

ei
si

 D

ei
si

   (13)
and
@ei
@t
=  @i
@ei
=  C 0i (ei; !) D0

ei
si

, (14)
respectively.
Flåm (1998) contended that players might have so-called restricted,
cyclic attention; the dimensionality of individual decision spaces can of-
ten exceed what the agents can handle at one time. With two variables
they must contend with only one decision at a time, scrutinizing the other
variable later. Using Flåms approach I model every pair of decisions of si
and ei as each being made by two independent individuals. The immediate
payo¤ for a rm (in the form of reduced expenses) caused by an adjustment
in one variable at one stage, is then viewed as being obtained by the player
in charge of that variable.
The advantage of the above approach is that I am able to compact no-
tation into a format that analyzes the current situation as a regular game
between a set J of jJ j = 1 + 2 jIj non-cooperative players, where each player
has to contend with only one variable. I dene then a vector of variables
x 2 RjJ j+ as
x = (xj)j2J :=
 
; s1; s2; :::; sjIj;e1; e2; ::::; ejIj

and assign for the time derivative of each xj
( _xj)j2J :=
 
_; _s1; _s2; :::; _sjIj; _e1; _e2; ::::; _ejIj

.
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Finally, I assign an adjustment function Mj for each of the variables
(Mj)j2J :=

z; @1
@s1
; @2
@s2
; :::; @jIj
@sjIj
; @1
@e1
; @2
@e2
; :::; @jIj
@ejIj

.
With the above notation I write
_xj = Mj (xj; x j; !) for j 2 J , (15)
where xj is the decision variable and x j := (xl)l 6=j denotes the vector of
choices made by the rivals of j. Discretizing (15) with adjustment variables
(superscript) indexed by the integer k to denote the previous period yields
the process
xk+1j = PXj

xkj + hj;kMj
 
xkj ; x
k
 j; !
k

for j 2 J . (16)
Here the operator PXj denotes the orthogonal projection onto the nonempty
compact interval Xj := [0; xj] where xj is a suitable upper bound for variable
j. Stepsize sequences (hj;k)k may vary between each j 2 J , but a common
feature is that X
k
hj;k =1 and
X
k
h2j;k <1 for all j: (17)
This condition (17) will ensure su¢ cient adjustments of strategies in the long
run. In addition, M := (Mj)j2J is Lipschitz continuous on X :=
Q
j2J Xj
and there exists a unique Nash equilibrium (Proposition 3). Then, Theorem
2 in Flåm (1998) supports the following.
Proposition 5. (Deterministic case: ! , E [!]). The repetitive play (16)
between a planner and rms that gives restricted, cyclic attention to their
decisions, converges to the Nash equilibrium. 
The remark on uncertainty in Flåm (1998), asserts (by referring to Flåm,
1996) that the inclusion of stochastic elements (our !) in the same play gen-
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erates a process that almost surely converges to the Nash equilibrium. The
process may then rightly be called a stochastic approximation of the deter-
ministic case (Benaim, 1996; Benveniste et. al., 1990).
5 Numerical Illustration
My numerical illustration is a simulation of playersbehavior in the regulation
game described in the above section. The integer k denotes the number
of regulation periods (e.g., years) since the introduction of the regulatory
regime. The tax (3) is paid at the end of each regulation period and the
permit quantities for the coming period must then be re-purchased.
The damage function is D (e) = e=4 + e2=8. All rms (jIj = 100) in the
regulated industry have access to the same abatement cost function (same
technology), specied as Ci (ei; !) = ! (1=100  ei + 25e2i ) for all i. The
distribution of ! is lognormal and has a standard deviation  = 0:1 and a
mean E [!] = 1. Feasible domains are specied to Xj 2 [0; 1] for all j. The
deterministic (! , 1) Nash equilibrium is ei = 0:01, si = 0:01 and  = 0:125.
Absent regulation, each rm i emits the quantity e0i = 0:02. Initial alloca-
tion of shares is determined by the regulator and is set equal to s0i = 0:01 for
all i. The initial price for permits is specied to 0 = 0:245. Figure 1 shows
the resulting values for k. Figures 2 and 3 show ski and e
k
i , respectively, for
the representative rm. All gures has k on the abscissa axes and two curves
are presented. The deterministic curve (labeled ! , 1), and the stochastic
approximation curve (labeled  = 0:1) where !k is sampled anew for each k.
For all j stepsizes are chosen according to the formula hj;k = 1= (50 + k).
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Figure 1. Permit price  in regulation period k.
Figure 2. Permit holdings si in regulation period k.
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Figure 3. Emissions ei in regulation period k.
6 Concluding Remarks
I have outlined a simple scheme for diminishing pollution created by a multi-
ple rm industry. The planner needs no information about the rmsabate-
ment costs, but does observe emissions at the rm level and knows marginal
damage. The heart of the scheme is the non-linear tax levied on each rms
emission. Individual shares that rms buy in a competitive permit market
calibrate this tax.
The construct, the Individual Transferable Share Permit System, was sug-
gested in Berglann (2012) and analyzed using equilibrium notation. This
paper has gone beyond that traditional approach. I prove and illustrate that
the system is stable in the sense that the steady state is likely to emerge even
under circumstances where each player has bounded cognitive capacity and
is plagued by uncertainty.
To show such stability, I use di¤erential system theory and stochastic
approximation, and I assume that parties are guided by simple heuristic rules.
Individual improvements come forth by iterative strategy adjustments, and
learning is represented by a graduate decrease in stepsize length. The role
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of the regulator is, in a Walrasian auctioneer manner, to instill the price of
shares so that they total one.
Currently, linear taxation and quantity regulation are the prevailing alter-
natives. Mechanisms based on non-linear taxation that thus far is proposed
in economic literature, has been regarded as too complex for practical pur-
poses. The current proposal, however, may turn that perception around.
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